

ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	PERC-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-00	FBIE-00	VC-00
	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00
	M-00	NEA-00	NRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-00	OIC-00
	OMB-00	NIMA-00	PA-00	GIWI-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	FMPC-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	SCRS-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2097
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USLO TRIPOLI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001214

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: OUTREACH TO DARFUR REBEL MOVEMENTS

REF: STATE 137022

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (SBU) Summary: SuQ Liberation Movement (SLM) members say that they will not be ready to return to the negotiating table on August 24. Special Representative to the Darfur Talks Ambassador John Yates, Ambassador Wall, and P/E officer delivered points per reftel to the SLM leaders on July 29 and in subsequent daily contacts. SLM's divisions remain unresolved and now they have been "summoned" by the field commanders for a conference in Darfur prior to returning to Abuja. SLM General Secretary Mini Minawi departed Libya for the field to prepare for a meeting. SLM members believe that a delay of the re-start of Abuja by approximately two weeks may be enough time for them to hold the meeting and prepare for the talks. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) On July 29, Ambassador Wall, visiting Special Representative to the Darfur Peace Talks John Yates, and P/E officer met with Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) members returned from Tripoli on July 28. The group included SLM's chief negotiator and head of delegation Abduljabar Dosa, Bahar Arabi, Trayo Ali Ahmed, Mohammed Harin, Magzoub Hussein, and several others. SLM leaders remained in Abuja and met for three days after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the traveled to Tripoli for two weeks.

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TRIPOLI AND ABUJA
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¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Yates asked the SLM members about their time in Tripoli and sought their views on Libyan intentions. Bahar said that the Libyans provided a hotel and meeting facilities for both SLM and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The Libyans arranged for SLM and JEM to sign an agreement to cease hostilities between the two groups. Some SLM members felt it necessary to go to Tripoli to keep an eye on their Chairman Abdelwahid Nur and JEM President Khalil Ibrahim. While in Tripoli, the SLM held internal meetings and discussed options for resolving its leadership dilemma prior to the next round of Abuja talks. However, SLM members do not view Libyan efforts as an alternative to the Abuja peace process and told Yates that the SLM remains fully committed to the current AU-led talks, despite the AU's weaknesses.

¶4. (SBU) Yates described his consultations in Addis Ababa and plans for the next round of talks, including the AU's idea of running concurrent negotiating sessions on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. Yates asked if SLM would be able to name various negotiators for this type of arrangement. Bahar said that given SLM's

unresolved divisions, it would be difficult to make it to Abuja on August 24 to negotiate and even more difficult to split the delegation without a significant amount of preparation in advance. Yates noted that time is running out on making preparations. The SLM members present were discouraged by the lack of progress, particularly dealing with Abdelwahid, who sat in on at least one meeting and was "unhelpful". Dosa, SLM's chief negotiator, agreed with Bahar's pessimism. Over the weekend of July 30, the SLM delegation received a letter from a group of field commanders demanding that SLM members convene a meeting in Darfur prior to returning to Abuja. Bahar said that it is critical for SLM members to attend. He told P/E officer that SLM may respond to the AU invitation asking for a two-week delay so that SLM could hold its meeting. He also requested that the AU give to SLM a clear agenda and experts to work with SLM's designated negotiators on the key issues for discussion.

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CHADIAN OUTREACH EFFORTS
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15. (C) On July 31, Daoussa Deby hosted the SLM members at his home to a day-long luncheon. General Mahamat Ali, Special Advisor to the President for International Relations

Allam-mi Ahmad, and Faki Badradine, a spiritual advisor assigned some Darfur tasks, were also present. Daoussa, Ali, and Allam-mi work with the members of SLM on a regular basis. The inclusion of Badradine is an interesting development. The rebels describe his relationship with Ali and Daoussa as frosty at best. Badradine has unfettered access to President Deby and has arranged previous meetings between Deby and rebel movement members. According to Bahar, the day was spent discussing SLM's options for resolving its leadership differences and preparing for a meeting with President Idriss Deby.

16. (C) On August 1, the SLM members met with the President. Deby spoke French, while the rebels spoke Arabic and Daoussa translated. According to Bahar and Trayo, the President said that Chad would provide SLM whatever it needed to hold a meeting to resolve its differences. Deby promised its members safe passage in and out of Darfur through Chadian territory and other logistics assistance as needed. In addition, Deby told the SLM delegation that his invitation to Secretary General Mini Minawi remains open and that he would

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like to see Mini as soon as possible. He also asked the delegation why Mini says he is afraid to travel to Chad. Deby assured the delegation that Mini is welcome and that as the guest of the President, would have no problems in Chad. Bahar told us subsequently that he and others present will urge Mini to come. Bahar expects that Mini will accept this latest invitation.

17. (C) On the subject of Abdelwahid, Deby said that he has difficulty understanding the SLM's Chairman, but his invitation is also open. (Note: On previous occasions, Chadian officials, including Deby, have described Abdelwahid as "unstable". End Note.) The President also expressed his concern about Libyan meddling and asked the SLM why it continually travels to Tripoli. SLM members told Deby that the Libyans provided them with a venue to hold consultations and often give them transport, but that the SLM does not trust Libyan intentions.

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FED UP WITH JEM
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18. (C) In several meetings with P/E officer, Bahar, Dosa, and others said that SLM is highly concerned about Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's intentions and JEM's lack of presence on the ground. In Tripoli, Khalil's largesse was more evident than ever, according to Trayo. SLM members confirmed reports of Khalil's alleged 50 million USD deal with the Sudanese Government and the Libyans. Khalil allegedly received 6 million USD already and will get the rest after the final peace deal is signed. As a result of some additional "fact-finding" about Abdelwahid's relationship with Khalil, the SLM wants the African Union to revisit JEM's presence at the negotiating table. The SLM will likely request a verification of forces on the ground to prove that Khalil and JEM have no field presence. Another SLM effort underway includes meetings between SLM members and ex-JEM commander Mohammed Saleh to persuade him to join his forces with theirs. (Comment: Mohammed Saleh, however, may have other plans. He may sign a deal to bring disgruntled Movement for National Reform and Development (MNRD) to his camp. End Comment.)

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THE VIEW FROM ABDELWAHID
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¶ 9. (C) Abdelwahid Nur, who left Tripoli for Nairobi two weeks ago, continues to complain about Libyan meddling despite reports that he has also profited financially from his relationship with Libya. He claims that Mini has accepted Libyan material support in the form of uniforms and vehicles. In several telephone conversations and other communications, Abdelwahid expressed his fear of participating in "rigged" leadership discussions. He says he will not go to the field and insists on having a leadership conference after the Abuja process is completed. On Tripoli, Abdelwahid claims that Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha and Daoussa Deby were both there to consult the Libyans and Mini Minawi on the issue. According to Abdelwahid, the aim

of these consultations was to develop a leadership equation for SLM based and weighted on ethnic representation. He claimed that one of the reasons behind this included Abdelwahid's relationship with Dr. John Garang. From Abdelwahid's perspective, such a formula would be heavily weighted toward the Zaghawa, leaving Fur, Masselit, and Dadjo with less representation. Rather than a field conference, Abdelwahid is suggesting a meeting of key leaders in Asmara prior to Abuja. (Comment: Abdelwahid fears being voted out at a field conference. End Comment.)

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PERSPECTIVES FROM "OTHER" CAMPS
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¶ 10. (C) On July 19, another non-Zaghawa SLM leader, Dr. Sanusi El Sanusi told P/E officer that he supports holding a conference in three months, after the rains stop. He does not believe SLM's differences will be settled by any other way and is pessimistic that they can be papered over enough to resume in Abuja on August 24. Sanusi wanted to travel to N'Djamena after Tripoli, but claims that the Libyans are "holding" him and his delegation of some 40 members because they will not accept the deal being offered to them by the GOS through the Libyans. (Note: The Libyan Government is dragging its feet on preparations for the SLM members' departure. End Note.)

¶ 11. (C) On another Zaghawa front, SLM members Adam Shogar and Sharif Harir have been on the Chadian-Sudanese border near Bahai. The SLM leadership and the Chadian Government have contacted them to come to N'Djamena. They reportedly have a great deal of cash and are recruiting intellectuals, traditional leaders, and some fighters. They intended to go into Darfur to garner support in advance of an all-SLM conference. Having run into difficulty in the form of Mini Minawi's commanders, they have moved between Tine and Bahai for the past month. JEM members and some SLM members have expressed concern for their safety and fear that there could be a clash between them and Mini's commanders in coming weeks. Mini's camp's suspicions that Shogar and Harir's moves are an attempted leadership grab are likely correct. Harir told P/E officer prior to his departure on June 26 that his intention was to build support among Zaghawa disaffected with Mini to participate in SLM's leadership structure. However, humanitarian workers report various sightings of the group. Shogar and Harir appear to be recruiting soldiers and Harir has been seen in a military uniform. P/E officer is in regular contact with both Shogar and Harir and has urged them not to undertake any military actions. Mini's camp is willing to accept Shogar and Harir back into the fold if they return to N'Djamena, according to Bahar.

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COMMENT
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¶ 12. (C) It is clear that many SLM representatives believe they will not be ready to return to the negotiating table on August 24. The momentum is building for the SLM to gather in Darfur to settle their leadership issues. We expect that SLM will request a delay in the re-start of the talks.

¶ 13. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL

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